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OF MARYLAND FAVOR THE INJURED WORKER?
Ronald J. Levasseur

NO
The Maryland Workers' Compensation Act was
designed to "provide compensation to injured workers
in accordance with a statutory plan for work related
disabilities." Unfortunately, a contest has developed
between the various parties both at the Workers' Compensation Commission and in appeals in an effort to gain
an advantage. The appellate courts of Maryland have
long pronounced that uncertainties or conflicts regarding questions of construction ofthe Workers' Compensation Act should be resolved in favor of the claimant. 1
At first glance, it would appear that the claimant is given
great advantage under the law. However, in the reality
of representing injured workers before the Workers'
Compensation Commission, what you see is not always
what you get.
It is easy to point to excerpts of statutory language
and isolated judicial decisions and conclude that the
injured worker is the true beneficiary of our State's
workers' compensation system. However, the vast
majority ofworkers 'compensation claims are resolved
at the Commission level. At this stage, the employer or
insurer, rather than the claimant, gains a great deal of
control over the process of deciding workers' compensation claims, inevitably sacrificing the well-being of
both the injured worker and the overall system.
There are four main areas where the law, not as it is
written but as it is applied, serves to deter any true
chance that the injured worker has to receive benefits
commensurate with his disability, including an effective
retraining and rehabilitation program that will enable
him to re-enter the job market at a level reasonably

coordinate with his previous employment.
Vocational Rehabilitation
The vocational rehabilitation section of the Workers' Compensation Act is set forth in the Labor and
Employment Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland. 2 The purpose of providing vocational rehabilitation to an injured worker is "to return the disabled
covered employee to suitable gainful employment."3
Unfortunately, the interdependence between vocational rehabilitation providers and insurance companies is
much too close, requiring vocational experts to rely
upon insurance company representatives to approve or
disapprove their recommendations. 4
When the Workers' Compensation Commission
finds that an injured worker is entitled to vocational
rehabilitation, it refers that employee to a vocational
rehabilitation provider. The employer or insurer must
pay the expenses associated with the vocational rehabilitation ofits covered employee. 5 On its face, vocational
rehabilitation looks to be a real boon to the claimant - an opportunity to develop his body and mind to obtain
maximum employability. But appearances are deceiving under our workers' compensation system.
The fact that the employer or insurer controls the
payment for rehabilitation services provided to the
claimant essentially serves to shift the focus of the
vocational rehabilitation provider from the injured
worker to the employerlinsurer. Natural economic selfinterests make it obvious that the true client ofvocational rehabilitation providers is the employer/insurer who
(continued on page 35)
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al rehabilitation providers is the employer/insurer who
pays the bills. This close relationship is further facilitated by the inescapable nature of the employer/insurer's
involvement in the vocational rehabilitation system.
Vocational rehabilitation providers rely upon employer/insurers to provide a steady stream of clients. This
reliance is gradually transformed into subservience and,
as "the customer is always right," the wishes of the
employer/insurer take precedence over the best interests of the injured worker.
The law allows the employer/insurer to select and
exert de facto control over the vocational rehabilitation
provider and the rehabilitation program in general.
Employer/insurers are economic entities primarily concerned with the bottom line and, as such, coerce vocational rehabilitation providers to follow the cheapest
program possible. In an overwhelming majority of
cases, this results in low cost "job searches" for the
worker, frequently frustrating the intended vocational
rehabilitation purpose. Too often, the worker is placed
in situations where he is not comfortable and does not
have the training needed to obtain a position that will
compensate him anywhere near his previous salary.
The facts of the situation are thus: the employer/
insurer has undue influence over the vocational rehabilitation provider. Rather than provide costly but effective skills retraining programs or educational opportunities, the least expensi ve means possi ble are utilized to
get the worker a low-paying, low-skilled job. This aids
the employer/insurer's goal of minimizing the cost of
workers' compensation but does nothing to advance
the desires of the claimant or the statutory intent of the
system. As long as the law is interpreted as not requiring
the independence of vocational rehabilitation providers, and input from both sides in vocational rehabilitation decisions is not solicited, the vocational rehabilitation component of the workers' compensation system
will continue to be subtly wielded to the advantage of
employers and insurers.

remain unchanged at 66 2/3% of the average weekly
wage. 8 The tri-part disability system ties the level of
benefits that the injured worker is eligible to receive to
impairment ratings given by physicians. Usually, the
employer/insurer and the claimant produce impairment
ratings by different physicians. Obviously, each physician has some degree of allegiance to the best interests
ofthe party who is the actual client, again out ofnormal
economic self-interest.
The three-tier plan, designed to decrease the overall
costs and delays inherent in administering the workers'
compensation system, has resulted only in cutting costs
for the employer/insurer. The added third tier, intended
for less serious inj uries, enables the employer/insurer to
pay minimal benefits to the injured worker. How this
adaption of workers' compensation law can be thought
in any way to aid the cause of claimants is beyond the
pale of common sense. The employer/insurer manipulates the system and contains costs by, explicitly or
implicitly, directing physicians to place the impairment
ratings within the lowest possible tier of benefits. An
impairment rating which is only slightly less than that
given by a claimant's treating physician can result in the
denial of thousands of dollars in benefits to which the
injured worker would otherwise be entitled.
While this aspect ofthe three-tier structure by itself
is sufficiently contrary to the intent of the workers'
compensation law, the repercussions to the system
caused by the employer/insurer's use of the three-tier
advantages is even more troubling. StipUlations have
become increasingly difficult to negotiate due to the fact
that the employer/insurer generally will not agree to any
stipulation that would push benefit entitlements into a
higher tier. As such, even minor discrepancies between
physicians' impairment ratings are forced before the
Commission for it to determine into which tier a claim
should be placed. This, of course, clogs the system and
creates longer waits for hearings in all categories,
including temporary total disability payments, medical
bill payments, and other areas to which the three-tier
system is inapplicable.
Permanent Partial Disability
A recent study by the National Council on CompenOn January 1, 1988, Maryland introduced a threetier structure for the classification of permanently par- sation Insurance (NCCI) reports that 61 % of permatially disabled workers. The law applies to incidents that nent partial disability claims involve contested impairoccur after January 1, 1988 and creates a minor disabil- ment rating determinations. 9 This same study noted that
ity section. 6 This section reduces the amount of awards in Maryland, an injured worker waits a median of fifty
for disabilities of less than 75 weeks duration to 33 11 days before receiving any workers' compensation pay3% of the average weekly wage. 7 Awards of75 weeks ments, almost twice the median waiting period in twelve
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other states reviewed by the NCC!. Further, 91 % of
workers' compensation claimants surveyed in the study
found it necessary to retain counsel to assist them in
receiving benefits. Worse, the expanding number of
cases forced to be litigated on appeal to the circuit
courts, with the attendant costs to the claimant, are not
even factored into the study. 10 It is foolhardy to suggest
that these alarming numbers, in a system supposedly
geared to assisting the injured worker quickly and
efficiently, are not interrelated and that the three-tier
system is not a root cause ofthe delays and difficulties.
It is the claimant who truly suffers under this
burden. It is the injured worker's bills that are not paid,
children's educations that are forced to suffer, and selfesteem that is left to flounder due to interminable
delays. These are the true victims of a system that has
gradually been transformed from a system which favored the injured worker at all stages into one which
provides only statutory "lip service" to the injured
worker while functionally serving as a "silent partner"
of the employer/insurer.

Impairment Ratings and Medical Evidence
By law, the Commission has the power to regulate
expenses for medical services rendered to claimants. II
This regulatory power extends to the costs associated
with the claimant obtaining medical evaluations for the
purpose of determining impairment ratings and presenting medical evidence to verify his physical capabilities. The theory behind this extensive regulation is that
the injured worker should be protected from having the
great bulk of his compensation award eaten up by
medical or legal expenses.
The rationale behind the regulation fades, however, in the arena of the employer/insurer's medical
evaluation costs. The employer/insurer is free to
engage multiple physicians and pay any fee required in
seeking medical evaluations, since these expenses are
not thought to directly diminish the amount ofcompensation that the injured worker may receive. While the
impact of the employer/insurer's unlimited medical
evaluation "war chest" on claimants' awards may not
be direct, the incongruous results that it produces are
substantial.
An injured worker is limited in both the number and
the cost of physicians by whom he can be evaluated.
Thus, in many cases, he is unable to obtain the best
medical advice possible or to seek suggested, yet
-:..:.
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costly, treatment in serious injury cases. The employer/
insurer has no such hurdles in presenting medical evidence to the Commission regarding its view of the
claimant's physical impairment and work capabilities.
Imagine this inequity in other fields oflaw. It is difficult
to fathom a system where one party in a dispute, whether
it be contractual, domestic, product liability, etc., is
capped by the fact finder and system administrator in the
amount he can spend for expert evidence and opinions,
while the other party is given carte blanche to buy as
many expert opinions as possible in order to overwhelm
the opponent, controlling the content of these opinions
with an ample checkbook.
The role that medical evaluation and opinion play in
the workers' compensation process cannot be underestimated. When the Commission determines the amount
of benefits to which a claimant is entitled in a permanent
partial disability case, it relies upon the impairment
ratings offered by the claimant's physician and the
physicians retained by the employer/insurer. Similarly,
medical opinions as to causation, tenure and extent,
medical improvement, and future work capabilities all
weigh heavily on almost every Commission decision.
The employer/insurer, by virtue ofits unlimited access to
medical diagnosis, has a precipitous advantage over the
claimant when contesting any of these issues before the
Commission. The Commission's adoption of one party's medical opinions can mean thousands of dollars in
benefits to the injured worker. That the worker, the
"beneficiary" of the workers' compensation system,
should not be allowed to seek these opinions on an even
basis seems fundamentally unfair and inconsistent with
overall statutory intent.
Recently, the Mary land General Assembly attempted to place the employer/insurer and the claimant on
more even ground when seeking medical evaluations
and diagnosis. House Bill 3 70, proposed in 1994, would
have expressly granted the Commission regulatory power over fees and charges for medical evaluations incurred
by the employer/insurer. In the face of heavy industry
opposition, HB 370 was unsuccessful, providing another example of why the Workers' Compensation Act has
evol ved into a tool of the employer/insurer rather than a
safety net for the injured worker.

Failure to Timely Pay for Medical Bills and Services
By law, the employer/insureris obligated to promptly pay medical bills and services required by an injured
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worker. 12 The law also imposes penalties for non- just compensation, to either return to work when
payment of medical bills within a prescribed time if set physically incapable, accept less benefits than to which
forth in an Order of the Workers' Compensation Com- they may be entitled, or face financial and personal ruin.
mission. I3 However, a hearing must be held for the The Workers' Compensation Act favors the injured
claimantto obtain such an Order. Non-payment causes worker in theory. It is the practice ofworkers' compenphysical as well as emotional harm to the injured sation that the employer/insurer has come to control.
worker. Health care providers often pursue payments
directly from the injured worker, in some instances
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